zerotracedocs

Trust model

What you have to trust when you use ZeroTrace, what you do not, and what each party, Pons included, could and could not do to you.

Nobody can reveal your notes for you: only your keys read them. You rely on mathematics, on code, on the holders of the vault's roles, on Pons for trading and fees, on your wallet and on your device. This page lists each party, what it can do, and what stops it.

The ZeroTrace contracts

The vault (PrivateVault) runs behind an ERC-1967 proxy and can be upgraded. The router (PrivateRouter), the fee harvester (FeeHarvesterV3), the verifier and the Poseidon2 hasher cannot: each is deployed once, with every address it works with fixed in its constructor, except the harvester's team recipient.

In the vault's current implementation:

  • Nobody can move or reveal a note, or single one out: a spend needs a valid proof and a signature by the owner's wallet, and the guardian's pause stops every spend at once.
  • The limits are constants or set at deployment: the hourly fee update, the ±10% price clamp, the harvester's 50% team share, its 0.5% price impact and 15% premium bounds on buys, the 0.5% cap on the caller's gas refund and the 0.1 ETH target deposit.
  • The one limit the guardian can move is the operation cost: what the network fee is worth in ETH, and the most an operation may cost the gas deposit. It starts at 0.0002 ETH, and the guardian can set it between two constants, 0.00005 ETH and 0.001 ETH. The two always move together, so an operation never costs the deposit more than it pays.
  • The EntryPoint deposit that pays for gas can be topped up by anyone, and no function withdraws it. The vault is not staked, and no function unlocks stake added with addStake.

An upgrade can change every one of these points.

The roles

The vault has three roles, and the harvester has an owner. At launch the deployer, 0x1B0210b9695BbEB8bD70964A46bf512021127A73, holds all four. Each can be handed to another address, such as a multisig, or renounced.

RoleCanCannot
Vault upgraderReplace the vault's implementation with any other, with no timelock: the new code takes effect in the transaction that installs it. That replaces the vault's rules, including what happens to the ZERO it holdsChange ZERO itself, the router, the harvester or Pons
Vault guardianPause every spend of a note (private sends, unshields, sales, payment-link claims), with no time limit, until it unpauses. Pause new entries: shield, and so private buys through the router. Pause exits handed to a target contract, such as private sales through the router. Set the operation cost between 0.00005 and 0.001 ETHMove, seize or reveal a note; set the operation cost outside its range; change the code
Vault adminGrant and revoke every role, its own included, to and from any address: it can give itself or anyone the upgrader's and the guardian's powersUpgrade or pause without first granting itself the role, which is public (RoleGranted)
Harvester ownerChange who receives the team's half; hand ZERO's creator fee recipient to another contract, at onceTouch the vault or the notes; spend the holders' half held by this harvester; change the split or the buy limits of this harvester

While the guardian pauses spends, every note stays where it is and nobody can spend it, its owner included. Shields and private buys keep working unless entries are paused too. An exit to a target that was already accepted is paid to its recipient as public ZERO while exits to a target are paused, and stays in escrow while spends are paused. The app closes its wallet screens while the vault is paused.

The refund contract has the same three roles, held by the deployer at launch: its guardian can pause claims, and its upgrader can replace its code, and with it the rules that pay each note of the earlier vault once. A refund above 10,000,000 ZERO is paid 24 hours after its claim, and until then the guardian can stop it; a stopped refund stays recorded and its ZERO stay in the contract. In an emergency, while claims are paused, its admin can withdraw the fund and the gas deposit: both are public on-chain transactions.

The harvester's new recipient decides from then on how ZERO's creator fees are used. Once the owner renounces, the recipient can never change again through the harvester.

The deployer also bought and locked the seed note and made the first gas deposit. The address that made ZERO's launch on Pons has no special rights over ZERO beyond triggering a sweep of the curve's fees: Pons pays ZERO's creator fees to the harvester, and only the harvester's owner, or the Pons owner (below), can change that. See ZERO on Pons.

ZERO and Pons

ZERO is a Pons V2 token: OpenZeppelin ERC20 plus ERC20Burnable, with no owner and no transfer restrictions. Nobody, Pons included, can mint it, freeze it or move it from an address, and that includes the vault's balance. Under the vault's current implementation, a note's ZERO stays in the vault until its owner spends the note.

ZERO trades on Pons contracts: its bonding curve, then the graduated Uniswap v4 pool with the Pons hook. Pons also collects the trade fees and pays the creator share to the harvester. So Pons decides:

Pons canEffect on ZeroTraceWhat it cannot do
Take its share of the fees: 30% of the 1% standard fee (protocolFeeShareBps 3000), frozen at launchThe harvester gets the rest, 0.7% of every trade: 0.35% to the team, 0.35% to private holdersChange ZERO's fee terms after launch
Redirect ZERO's creator fee recipient with setCreatorFeeRecipient, after a 3-day timelock (visible in pendingCreatorFeeRecipient)The harvester stops receiving fees: holder yield, the team's half and the ETH that tops up the gas deposit stopTouch the vault, the notes or anyone's ZERO
Use its owner's rescue functions on curves and graduations (rescueCurveFees, forceSweptGraduation, rescueSweptGraduation)Can affect the curve's fees and how and when ZERO moves to the pool, hence trading, the price the vault reads, and harvestsMove ZERO out of the vault
Stop serving the curve or the pool (for example a failed graduation)Private buys and router sales fail; an ERC-4337 sale whose swap fails delivers the ZERO to the ETH recipient insteadStop private sends or unshields, which never touch a Pons contract

The Pons owner is a contract, 0x263ed295dAFaE1d9AAdD6E56c4B6F9f38eE019Dd (read on-chain). This dependency is part of the design: it is what lets ZERO trade on every venue and aggregator that supports Pons.

The graduated pool is the one Pons creates: only the Pons factory can initialize a pool with its hook, and the router, the harvester and the vault use only that pool's id. Anyone can open another ETH/ZERO pool, but it has another id and ZeroTrace never trades or prices on it.

The circuit and the verifier

Every spend is a zero-knowledge proof for the transact circuit, written in Noir and proved with UltraHonk. The verifier checks it against public inputs the vault computes itself: the root, two nullifiers, two new commitments, the exiting shares, a hash of the external data and the vault's EIP-712 domain separator.

UltraHonk needs no ceremony for this circuit. It uses a universal reference string (CRS) shared by all circuits; the app serves pinned copies checked against fixed SHA-256 hashes. Soundness rests on:

  • the circuit enforcing membership, ownership through the nullifier key, correct nullifiers, conservation of shares (inputs = outputs + exit), 120-bit range checks and a valid wallet signature (see The circuit);
  • the generated verifier matching the circuit, and no soundness bug in Noir or Barretenberg (nargo 1.0.0-beta.25, bb 5.2.1);
  • Poseidon2 and keccak256 being collision resistant and secp256k1 ECDSA being unforgeable;
  • the universal CRS having been generated honestly.

If one fails, an attacker could create shares from nothing and take the vault's ZERO. This is the largest risk in the system. The verifier is an immutable of the vault's implementation, so replacing it takes an upgrade.

Your wallet

Your wallet signs two kinds of messages, and a third if you make payment links.

The activation signature. A Sign-In with Ethereum message that names the app's domain and a vault address. Its hash is the seed for your viewing key and your nullifier key. Anyone who obtains this signature can see all your notes, past and future. They cannot move them. See Keys.

One signature per spend. Every send, sale or unshield needs an EIP-712 Spend(bytes32 transaction) signature from the same wallet. transaction is the Poseidon2 hash of the proof's public inputs, so the signature covers the root, nullifiers, new notes, exit amount and the hash that binds recipient, fee and sale terms. The circuit checks the signature against the wallet key committed in your registered owner key. The domain separator binds it to this vault on this chain.

The payment links signature. Another Sign-In with Ethereum message, asked once per session before you make a payment link or open one from your history. The keys of your links derive from it and from a random nonce kept in your notes, so the activation signature alone does not open them.

Public actions (buying, approving the vault, shielding, registering) are ordinary transactions your wallet sends and shows in full.

You trust your wallet to keep its key secret and to sign deterministically: the app signs the activation message twice on first use and refuses wallets whose signatures differ. Only EOA-key wallets are supported (including EIP-7702 accounts and MPC wallets that produce one ECDSA signature), not contract-based multisigs.

The app (frontend)

The app derives your keys, scans for notes and builds the proof on your device. Keys live only in the page's memory and are not sent to a server. Its Content-Security-Policy allows only scripts served by the app (inline ones included) and limits connect-src to the app, the chain RPC, the bundler and the indexer, so injected code cannot fetch your keys to an arbitrary server. The proving CRS is served by the app, so proving contacts no third party.

The policy does not protect you from the app's own code. A compromised frontend (a malicious build on the real domain, or a fake site) could:

  • read your notes and balance once you activate privacy there;
  • ask you to sign a Spend for a transaction that pays someone else;
  • ask you to approve ZERO to an address other than the vault.

What the spend signature protects, and what it does not

The per-spend signature stops anyone who only has your activation signature or your keys. It does not stop an app you are actively using: your wallet shows the Spend request as a 32-byte hash, which you cannot check against the recipient or amount. Use only a frontend you trust, and check the domain in the activation message.

The harvester's callers

Anyone can call harvest(), and a ZeroTrace keeper does. The caller chooses only when a harvest happens. It gets back only the gas of a call that did work (topped up the deposit or bought ZERO), priced at no more than twice the base fee and capped at 0.5% of the ETH the call put to work, so calling it for nothing earns nothing. The team's half is set aside before anything else and is never spent on gas or ZERO.

The harvester buys at most once per L1 block, each buy moving the price by at most 0.5% and paying no more than 15% above the vault's price average after Pons fees. A buy that does not fit is made smaller or left for the next harvest. See Gas.

The indexer

The indexer is optional. One endpoint serves every vault event from a block onwards, the same for everyone, with no per-user queries, so it does not learn which notes are yours. The app checks the rebuilt tree's root with the vault's isKnownRoot and reads the chain directly on a mismatch or when the indexer is down. The indexer can see your IP address and when you sync. See The Merkle tree.

The bundler

Private transactions are ERC-4337 UserOperations whose sender is the vault. Any bundler can submit them.

  • It cannot change the recipient, gas fee, amounts or sale terms: their hash is a public input of the proof.
  • It cannot starve execution: the proof fixes a minimum callGasLimit that validation enforces.
  • It cannot make the gas deposit pay more than the fee covers: an operation's maximum gas cost may not exceed the operation cost (0.0002 ETH at the start), which is what its network fee is worth at the price average.
  • It can refuse to submit. Any other bundler works, or a direct call paid by an address you choose, which reveals that address.

See Gas.

The RPC node

The node answers the app's reads and relays transactions, and sees your IP address and calls. A lying node could hide events or give wrong reads, but the vault rejects any proof on a root it does not know: it can make a transaction fail, not succeed wrongly.

Robinhood Chain's sequencer

The sequencer orders transactions and decides which ones enter a block. It filters transactions tied to sanctioned addresses. It could censor transactions to the vault, or delay them. It cannot forge a proof, spend a note or change a transaction's contents. This dependency cannot be removed.

Summary

PartyCanCannot
Vault upgrader (the deployer at launch)Replace the vault's implementation, and so its rules, at once, with no timelockChange ZERO, the router, the harvester or Pons
Vault guardian (the deployer at launch)Pause every spend of a note, with no time limit; pause new deposits (shields and private buys); pause exits handed to a contract (private sales through the router); set the operation cost between 0.00005 and 0.001 ETHMove, seize or reveal notes; change the code
Vault admin (the deployer at launch)Grant and revoke every role, to and from any addressAct without granting itself the role first
Harvester owner (the deployer at launch)Change the team's recipient; hand ZERO's creator fee recipient to another contract at once, which then decides how future fees are usedTouch the vault or the notes; spend the holders' half in this harvester
Pons (its owner)Redirect the creator fees after a 3-day timelock, use its rescue functions, take its 30% shareMove ZERO from the vault or any address, touch notes, change fee terms after launch
Circuit and verifierEverything, if unsoundNothing extra, if sound
Holder of your activation signatureSee all your notes and historySpend them
Whoever controls your wallet keyEverything: re-derive your keys and sign spends—
Compromised frontendRead your notes; get you to sign a harmful spend or approvalSpend without your wallet's signature
Harvest callerChoose when fees are harvested; get back the gas of a call that did workBuy more than once per L1 block, move the price more than 0.5%, or pay more than 15% above the price average
IndexerWithhold data, see IP and timingLearn which notes are yours; alter the note tree without detection
BundlerCensor, see IP and timingChange recipient, fee or amounts; starve execution
RPC nodeCensor, lie about reads, see IP and callsMake an invalid transaction succeed
SequencerCensor or delayForge, steal or change a transaction

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